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ARCHETYPES OF FAITH: HOW AMERICANS
SEE, AND BELIEVE IN, THEIR
CONSTITUTION
Aliza Plener Cover*
In this Article, I offer a new framework to illuminate how American faith in
the Constitution is sustained over time. I build upon the evocative Passover story
of the Four Sons—one of whom is wise, one wicked, one simple, and one who
does not know how to ask—and argue that these archetypes resonate deeply in
the constitutional context. I identify the “wise sons” of the American
constitutional community—the legal elites who maintain the vitality of the
constitutional faith through a fastidious, intergenerational, yet somewhat
detached analysis of the intricacies of law; the “simple sons”—the People writ
large, who relate to the Constitution through deep yet nontechnical faith in its
overarching principles and symbolic significance; the “wicked sons”—those who
have been historically excluded from the constitutional community and those
whose faith is tempered by doubt; and the “sons who do not know how to ask”—
the young and those marginalized into silence. Although its primary function is
explanatory rather than predictive, this Four Sons framework reveals new
insights into why and how the Constitution has retained its symbolic significance
as Higher Law. And while most judicial opinions will not—and need not—
consciously engage with these multiple constitutional audiences, this framework
illuminates why certain opinions such as Brown v. Board of Education attain
canonical status by deliberately and successfully speaking to each of the Four
Sons.

INTRODUCTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH .......................................................... 556	
  
I.	
   THE FOUR SONS AND THE INTERGENERATIONAL FESTIVAL OF PASSOVER ....... 559	
  
II.	
   THE WISE SON .................................................................................................. 563	
  
A.	
   The Keepers of Intergenerational Faith ..................................................... 564	
  
B.	
   The Problem of Formalism ......................................................................... 565	
  
C.	
   The Detachment of the Elite ....................................................................... 567	
  
III.	
  THE SIMPLE SON ............................................................................................... 570	
  

* Associate Professor, University of Idaho College of Law. J.D., Yale Law School;
B.A., Yale College. I owe thanks to Benjamin Plener Cover, Kenji Yoshino, Anna
VanCleave, Rich Seamon, and the participants in the Inland Northwest Scholars Workshop
for their insights and support.

555

556

STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW

[Vol. 26:555

A.	
   The Constitution as Symbol ........................................................................ 571	
  
B.	
   The People’s Constitution........................................................................... 574	
  
IV. THE WICKED SON ............................................................................................. 577	
  
C.	
   The Problem of Exclusion ........................................................................... 579	
  
D.	
   The Problem of Doubt ................................................................................ 585	
  
V.	
   THE SON WHO DOES NOT KNOW HOW TO ASK ............................................... 588	
  
A.	
   The Educational Imperative ....................................................................... 589	
  
B.	
   The Precipice of Silence ............................................................................. 590	
  
VI.	
   BROWN AS PEDAGOGICAL MOMENT ................................................................. 592	
  
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 595	
  

INTRODUCTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH1
At the same time as it bans the “establishment of religion,”2 America’s
Constitution brings a new faith into being—a faith in the Constitution itself.
The Constitution is not merely a charter of government, ratified by an elite
minority in the 1700s and amended at various intervals across the nation’s
history. The Constitution has come to symbolize something much greater: it has
become the sacred text of an American community of faith.3
“Veneration” of the Constitution has become a central, even if sometimes
challenged, aspect of the American political tradition. . . . “The flag, the
Declaration, the Constitution—these . . . constitute the holy trinity of what
Tocqueville called the American ‘civil religion.’” These formal symbols—and
the historical experiences they condense—evoke, for some, what the late
Alexander Bickel once termed “the secular religion of the American republic,”
in which “we find our visions of good and evil.”4

The Constitution is accurately called Higher Law5—and not only out of
respect for the Supremacy Clause.6 It is the source to which Americans turn
when their countrymen fail them; it is the promise of redemption in a currently
imperfect political system.7 It is a document that binds a pluralistic and often
internally incompatible population into a unified people.8 While some scholars
would prefer to characterize this “faith” in the fallible, man-made Constitution

1. I borrow this term both from Justice Hugo Black and from Professor Sanford
Levinson. HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1968); SANFORD LEVINSON,
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. See LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 96 (“The United States is, from [one] perspective, a
distinct ‘faith community,’ with the Constitution as . . . its central sacred text.”).
4. Id. at 11.
5. See, for example, Bruce Ackerman’s attention to “higher lawmaking.” BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
7. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 75 (2011); Jack M. Balkin, Idolatry and
Faith: The Jurisprudence of Sanford Levinson, 38 TULSA L. REV. 553, 560 (2003).
8. As Levinson points out, however, the religiosity of constitutional interpretation
also leads to strife where interpretive disconnects arise. See LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 17.
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and its accoutrements as a form of idolatry,9 I pass no judgment on this front.
For my purposes, I only note that the devotion inherent in both forms of
worship is similar. An idolater’s god may be false, but he reveres it
nonetheless. In characterizing the American Constitution as an article of faith, I
mean only to capture its deep appeal to emotion—rather than its surface
reliance upon rationality; I mean to emphasize its core, constitutive role in
Americans’ self-understanding—rather than its detached existence as formal
law.
American constitutional faith is an intergenerational enterprise—as it must
be, in order to sustain itself over time. The Constitution’s invocation by a
timeless “We the People” has invited intergenerational slippage in authorship
and ownership,10 and retained the document’s symbolic potency even as the
founding moment recedes into distant history. This endurance of American
faith across the generations is, at some level, surprising. Like all faith-based
communities, America faces the challenge of maintaining the vitality and
viability of its collective faith over time—not through blunt violence,11 but
through a pedagogy that is responsive to the multiplicity of viewpoints,
individual experiences, and ways of understanding reflected in the community.
Indeed, America faces added challenges of tremendous demographic diversity
and substantial inequality. Under such conditions of disunity, how is
constitutional faith sustained both vertically—across generations—and
horizontally—across contemporaneous populations with vastly different lived
experiences of the Constitution’s promise?
In the hopes of beginning to answer this question, I draw a comparison to
another faith-based legal system: Judaism. I pick Judaism as my point of
comparison not only because it is the faith with which I am most familiar, but
also because of the special relationship between law and faith in Judaism that
makes it well-suited to constitutional comparison. Neither Judaism nor
American constitutionalism is wholly faith-based, nor wholly law-based. Each
is a blend—which makes Judaism a particularly useful analog for analyzing
9. Steven D. Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, 79 VA. L. REV. 583,
587-88 (1993) (“[M]odern constitutional interpretation . . . is a religious enterprise in the
sense that it is dependent upon the (usually tacit) assumption of transcendent authority. More
precisely, inasmuch as the transcendent authority upon which these theories implicitly rely is
illusory, legal interpretation can most accurately be understood as a species of ‘idolatry.’
Moreover, the leading temple devoted to this idolatrous practice is not the so-called ‘civil
religion’ of Constitution-worship attributed to popular culture, but rather the legal academy
itself.”).
10. See Note, The Faith to Change: Reconciling the Oath to Uphold with the Power to
Amend, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1747, 1754 (1996).
11. I do not suggest that American constitutionalism operates independently of
violence, for, of course, American faith in the Constitution is situated within a violent system
of law. See infra Part IV.B. Ultimately, however, I do not believe that violence is a full
explanation for most Americans’ adherence to their Constitution, and I argue that a
freestanding faith is at least as important. Violence, perhaps, explains why the Constitution is
law; faith explains why the Constitution is higher law. Given that distinction, we would do
well to understand how that faith functions to create a sustainable community over time.
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constitutional faith, despite the fact that Christianity has borne a more obvious
impact upon the structure of the constitutional order. Judaism, in comparison to
Christianity, places greater emphasis on action than faith. Faith in God, of
course, runs through the entire project of Judaism, but individuals are judged on
their conduct, not on their belief. Likewise, American constitutionalism
emphasizes obedience more than faith. We must seek out the role of faith in the
constitutional order; it is not always readily apparent. To understand a Jewish
or a constitutional faith, one must look to the interaction between fidelity to law
and faith in law’s principles—to the way that laws and principles are supported
by a community over time.
Within Judaism, there is a both a conscious attention to the project of
intergenerational faith, as well as a recognition of the heterogeneity within a
faith community that complicates and informs this project. A striking
meditation on these themes is offered by the famous pedagogical tale of the
Four Sons, which explores how a father should relate to different types of
children in recounting the story of Passover. This Article develops an extended
analogy to the Four Sons story. Without accepting the judgmental connotations
of their names, this Article considers whom we might identify as the “Four
Sons” of the American constitutional faith, and how the pedagogical insights of
the Jewish tale transfer to the constitutional context. I explore these archetypes
from a distinctly cultural lens—seeking to illuminate, rather than reform, our
national commitments, so that we might better understand ourselves.12
Through the literary vehicle of the Four Sons, I offer a new theoretical
framework for understanding the way in which a complex nation—not bound
by any shared God, ethnic history, or intellectual disposition—nonetheless
keeps faith with a single document. This framework is at its core relational.
Americans interact not only with the text or symbol of the Constitution, but
also co-exist within a polity composed of people who interact with the
Constitution in markedly dissimilar ways. The success of the constitutional
project depends on the ability of these constitutional actors to communicate
with one other.
The Article proceeds in six parts. In Part I, I describe the Jewish Four
Sons—one wise, one wicked, one simple, and one who does not know how to
ask—and contextualize their situation within the self-consciously
intergenerational holiday of Passover. I then consider each son in turn. In Part
II, I begin with the “wise sons” of the American constitutional community—the
legal elites who maintain the vitality of the constitutional faith through a

12. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 30 (1999) (“We must first bring the legal world to light, by raising to selfconscious examination the social and psychological meanings of a world understood as the
rule of law. Who are we and what does our world look like when we find ourselves in this
culture of law’s rule? Both the mainstream and the radical scholar are too much of this world
to ask this question. We need a form of scholarship that gives up the project of reform, not
because it is satisfied with things as they are, but because it wants better to understand who
and what we are.”).
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fastidious, intergenerational, yet somewhat detached analysis of the intricacies
of law. In Part III, I next turn to the American “simple sons”—the People writ
large, who relate to the Constitution through deep yet nontechnical faith in its
overarching principles and symbolic significance. Part IV identifies the socalled “wicked sons” of our constitutional community—those who have been
historically excluded from its protections and those whose faith is tempered by
doubt—and considers the challenges posed by inequity, marginalization, and
dissent to the cohesiveness of the constitutional community. Part V discusses
the “son who does not know how to ask”—the young and the apathetic—and
the call to reach out and engage these members of the constitutional
community. Part VI argues that the Four Sons analogy helps us to understand
how Brown v. Board of Education—which successfully spoke to each of these
four sons—was a kind of “pedagogical moment” that itself became a canonical
article of constitutional faith.
I.   THE FOUR SONS AND THE INTERGENERATIONAL FESTIVAL OF
PASSOVER
The story of the Four Sons is one of the most famous and oft-debated
anecdotes recounted at the Passover seder. In full, the story reads:
With reference to four sons the Torah speaks: one wise, one wicked, one
simple and one who does not know to ask.
The wise son—what does he say? “What is the meaning of the testimonies
and statutes and ordinances which the Lord our God commanded you?”
Therefore explain to him according to the customs of Passover. That after the
final taste of the Paschal offering, one may not have dessert.
The wicked one—what does he say? “What is this service of yours?”—
‘yours,’ not his! Because he has excluded himself from the group, he has
repudiated the foundation. Therefore set his teeth on edge and say to him: “It
is because of what the Lord did for me when I came out of Egypt”—for me,
and not for him. If he had been there he would not have been redeemed.
The simple one—what does he say? “What is this?” And you shall say to
him: “By strength of hand the Lord brought us out of Egypt, from the house of
bondage.”
As for him who does not know to ask—you begin for him. It is said, “You
shall tell your son in that day, saying, ‘It is because of what the Lord did for
me when I came out of Egypt’.”13

The story of the Four Sons has been interpreted to mean many things by
scholars, rabbis, and seder participants across the ages. The story itself is a
rabbinical gloss on biblical text.
Four biblical verses (Deuteronomy 6:20; Exodus 12:26, 13:14, 13:8) merely
mention children asking or being told about the Exodus. From these disparate
verses the Rabbis created a framework for personalized pedagogic instruction.

13. Translation adapted from that in Fred O. Francis, The Baraita of the Four Sons, 42
J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 280, 281-83 (1974), using the author’s knowledge of Hebrew and by
comparing the Hebrew text to multiple English translations in other haggadot.
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They predicated dissimilar dispositions and varying degrees of maturity, and
counseled that the story of the Exodus should be geared to the attitude and age
of the questioner. “The parent should teach each child on the level of the
child’s understanding.”14

But who are these Four Sons, and what do we learn from the rabbis’
pedagogical paradigm? Perhaps most commonly, the sons are understood to
stand for four personality types—one engaged with tradition, one rebelling
against it, one with little understanding or knowledge of the tradition, and one
who is too young to know much of anything. In other words, the sons represent
different innate capacities or desires for faith and for learning. Another
common interpretation is that the sons represent different stages of maturity:
the wise son is the eldest, the wicked is the rebellious teenager, the simple is a
young child, and the one who does not know how to ask is an infant. According
to a more modern rendition, the Four Sons represent different generations of
Jews in a secularizing world, at different levels of attachment to their tradition.
In this light, the story tracks the trials and tribulations of modernity, and the
growing distance from text and faith with each passing generation.15 In a
slightly different interpretation, the Four Sons exist within one generation, but
represent the diverging attachments that modern Jews have to their faith,
relative to their involvement in the secular world. Finally, the Four Sons are
often considered to be four archetypes—four aspects of personality that every
person has in some measure, but that may emerge at the forefront at different
times in their lives. In this sense, we do well to remember that while the labels
given the sons are judgmental (there is no apparent ambiguity in the terms wise
and wicked), we need not fully condemn nor embrace any one of the sons. And,
of course, in the time-honored tradition of challenging and reinterpreting
conventional wisdom across the generations, we are also at liberty to question
why a father should respond as indicated to the questions posed. We can freely
ask—is the wise son really wise? Is the wicked son really wicked?
14. THE RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY, PASSOVER HAGGADAH: THE FEAST OF FREEDOM 38
(Rachel Anne Rabinowicz ed., 1982).
15. MARTIN SICKER, A PASSOVER SEDER COMPANION AND ANALYTIC INTRODUCTION TO
THE HAGGADAH 63-64 (2004) (“Israel Lau has suggested that the ‘four sons’ section of the
Haggadah may also be understood as a homily characterizing the attitudes of four very
different successive generations. The ‘wise’ son represents the generation that continues to
value Jewish tradition and learning, notwithstanding exposure to secular education, and
therefore is able to pose an informed question. The ‘wicked’ son represents the typical
offspring of the ‘wise’ generation, someone thoroughly imbued with secular culture who
views the Seder as an annual ordeal that he attends out of regard for his still traditional
parents. His attitude is reflected in the dismissive character of his question. The ‘simple’ son
reflects the generation of the children of the ‘wicked’ sons, who have virtually no
appreciation of the Seder traditions because they have not been exposed to them at home.
This son asks a legitimate albeit uninformed question about what the rite is all about. When
the ‘simple’ sons raise their own children, and their grandparents and great grandparents are
not longer readily accessible to them, the Passover and its rituals are so alien to them that
they do not know where to begin to try to understand what they see. In this case, the
Haggadah makes clear, it is the leader’s obligation to take the initiative in helping them learn
and understand the significance and value of the tradition.”).
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Having thus begun to parse the symbolism behind each of the sons, let us
think more broadly why their story appears in the Passover seder, and why it
has garnered such interest and prominence over the centuries. The festival of
Passover celebrates the Exodus from slavery in Egypt and with it, the founding
of the Jewish people as a people (rather than an enslaved group of individuals).
The story of the Exodus is tightly linked to the revelation of the Torah at Mount
Sinai, which would solidify the Jewish people’s collective identity.16 It is not
surprising, then, that this holiday, of all holidays, is most concerned with the
preservation of Jewish peoplehood—a task that necessarily implicates the
challenges of intergenerational continuity and adherence to a historical
covenant.17
Fittingly, the story of the Four Sons centers on the intergenerational
transmission of community knowledge. It is an instance of meta-storytelling—
it tells a story about how to tell stories. The anecdote invites its readers to
grapple with how different types of individuals relate to “their” tradition and to
identify ways of responding to those varied psychological stances. Thus, the
tale of the Four Sons reflects the holiday’s primary focus and command: the
intergenerational act of storytelling, of history telling.18 This trope is prevalent
throughout the seder. The core piece of the seder is called magid19—which
means “narrative” or “telling”—in which the full story of the Exodus (with
commentary) is recited and discussed. The act of storytelling highlights two
distinct intergenerational dynamics permeating the celebration of Passover:

16. Note that the festival of Shavuot (not Passover) actually celebrates the giving of
the Torah. However, the two holidays bookend (and are connected by) forty days of counting
the Omer. Thus the full story of redemption is begun on Passover.
17. American constitutionalism shares these preoccupations with intergenerational
continuity and covenant. Both traditions trace their system of belief back to a moment of
consent, of collective ratification of a specific way of life. For Americans, the ratification of
the Constitution of 1787 and its subsequent amendments constitute moments of collective
agreement to live by certain fundamental principles. The Jewish people look back to the
Covenant with God at Mount Sinai—to the acceptance of the Torah and, with it, the
obligation to live by God’s commandments. For both Jews and Americans, belief in the
system as a whole necessitates a relationship with that historical covenant and, through that
covenant, with an historical version of themselves. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 11
(1988) (citing ANNE NORTON, ALTERNATIVE AMERICAS: A READING OF ANTEBELLUM
POLITICAL CULTURE 25 (1986) (describing “America . . . as ‘bound up in a continuous
history that stretched from Abraham to the Constitution in a concatenation of covenants”)).
A modern person cannot form a full understanding of the Torah or Constitution without
transposing herself upon the founding generation—without understanding herself as part of
an intergenerational project.
18. The following passage is recited during the seder: “Even if we were all men of
wisdom, understanding, experience, and knowledge of the Torah, it would still be an
obligation upon us to tell about the Exodus from Egypt. The more one tells about the
Exodus, the more he is praiseworthy.” SHALOM MEIR WALLACH, THE PESACH HAGGADAH
29-31 (1989).
19. The word haggadah comes from the same root (H-G-D). The haggadah is the
book read at the seder to guide participants through its various rituals, songs, and teachings.
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first, reaching back to remember the experiences of those who came before, and
second, looking forward to tell the story to the future generations.
One the one hand, the festival is rich with reenactments that connect
modern Jews backward to their ancestors.20 For instance, Jews eat matza (the
bread of affliction) for the full eight days of Passover, to emulate their
forefathers who left Egypt in haste, without time to let their bread rise.21 Such
reenactments are designed to make concrete a symbolic intergenerational unity
of experience—as expressed in the words, “In every generation it is one’s duty
to regard himself as though he personally had gone out of Egypt . . . .”22
While Jews work to connect to their ancestors on Passover, they
simultaneously pay heightened attention to their duty to connect with future
generations. Hence, the rituals of Passover place deep emphasis on children—
on the obligation to teach children and, through them, to preserve the
intergenerational continuity of the Jewish people. After the first communal
song in magid, translated above, the youngest person at the seder asks the Four
Questions.23 The seder moves, then, between past and future to introduce the
storytelling of the seder. All of the reenactment and discussion to come is
posited as a response to the youngest generation’s search for knowledge.
Unlike many Jewish services in which the leader must be an adult—one who
has reached the age of bar mitzvah—Passover is led by the inquisitiveness of
the child.
Shortly after the recitation of the Four Questions, the haggadah turns its
attention to the Four Sons. I turn now to the same story—but this time, by
considering the “Four Sons” of the American constitutional faith. Passover
places the struggle for intergenerational continuity in stark relief; though it has
no comparable holiday, America’s constitutional system likewise depends on a
continuity of faith from a Founding generation to the current one, and forward
into the future. In thinking of the American people through the lens of the Four

20. Other Jewish holidays likewise involve reenactment to maintain continuity with
the Jewish forefathers. Take sukkot, in which modern Jews dine in huts for eight days to
symbolize how their ancestors wandered in the desert in temporary dwellings.
21. The traditions of the seder also recreate aspects of the Passover story. Bitter herbs
and salt water represent the suffering and tears of slaves. Haroset, a delicious brick-red mash
of apples, nuts, cinnamon, and wine, symbolizes the bricks that Jewish slaves made for their
Egyptian masters. At the same time as the seder symbolically reenacts slavery, it also
recreates the experience of redemption. Seder participants recline on pillows to represent the
luxury and comfort of freedom.
22. WALLACH, supra note 18, at 103. In this vein, the storytelling portion of the
seder—magid—begins by connecting the rituals of the seder to the experiences of the past.
Uncovering and raising the matza, all guests at the seder sing: “This is the bread of affliction
that our fathers ate in the land of Egypt. Whoever is hungry—let him come and eat!
Whoever is needy—let him come and celebrate Pesach! Now, we are here; next year may we
be in the Land of Israel! Now, we are slaves; next year may we be free men!” Id. at 25
(emphasis added).
23. Interestingly, the existence of pre-written questions helps to alleviate the confusion
of the son who does not know how to ask—tradition has created questions for him that he
can simply recite.
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Sons, I attempt to capture an image of how vastly diverse Americans identify
with their faith across generations; and explore the challenges of speaking of
that faith in a universal voice to a multidimensional community.
II.   THE WISE SON
The wise son—what does he say? “What are the testimonies and statutes and
ordinances [ha-eidot v’hachukim v’hamishpatim] which the Lord our God
commanded you?” Therefore explain to him according to the customs of
Passover. That after the final taste of the Paschal offering, one may not have
dessert.
The wise son comes from a place of familiarity with Jewish tradition and
fluidity in its language; we can assume that he already knows the broad
principles behind Passover and how Passover fits into the larger Jewish
tradition. He knows, in fact, that there are three different types of
commandments (mitzvot)—eidot, chukim, and mishpatim. From that solid
theoretical background, he speaks of technicalities—and his father responds in
keeping. Instead of explaining the significance of redemption, the father notes
when dessert may be eaten at the seder—an important piece of the ritualized
holiday, but by no means the most significant part of the Passover festival as a
whole.24 Some would argue that son and father have missed the meaning and
spirit of Passover in this preoccupation with minutia. Others—following the
more traditional Jewish perspective—would argue that these details only matter
to the wise son because he has an underlying faith in and fear of God: his
concern with technicalities is evidence not that he misses the forest for the
trees, but rather that he appreciates each tree as a part of a beautiful and
awesome forest.
If we compare the Four Sons to archetypes within the American
constitutional order, the wise son finds his clearest analog in the legal elite—
judges, lawyers, and academics who keep faith with the Constitution through
legalistic, technical methods. The legal elite perpetuate the relevance of the
Constitution by arguing over its most minute details in law journals and by
applying it, in every possible permutation, to real world scenarios in the courts.
Major constitutional principles evolve over time through an intergenerational
discussion of the details. How should Congress’s powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment correspond to the Court’s? What level of scrutiny should judges
apply to a particular instance of alleged discrimination? What are the contours
of standing and federal jurisdiction?
Over the next pages, by considering the textual description and larger
significance of the “wise son” in Jewish tradition, I will explore what this
24. Note that in the actual Bible passage from which this story was derived, the wise
son’s question received a much more detailed response that spoke more directly to the
redemptive Passover storyline. See Deuteronomy 6:20-24.
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analogy—wise son as legal elite—can teach us about the role of the legal elite
in the perpetuation of constitutional faith.
A.   The Keepers of Intergenerational Faith
To understand the classic Jewish extolment of the wise son, it is helpful
to have in mind a sketch of Jewish history—and to understand that rabbis kept
their religion alive throughout generations of exile and persecution by studying
the details of Jewish law. After the destruction of the Second Temple in 70
A.D. and the Jews’ exile from the Land of Israel, the center of Jewish religious
life shifted from sacrifice-based worship, led by priests in the Temple, to studyand prayer-based worship, led by rabbis at centers of learning in the Diaspora.
Over generations of exile, rabbis slowly wrote and compiled the Talmud, or
Oral Torah—a voluminous collection of commentaries on biblical text that
attained equal significance to the Written Torah itself. Throughout the writing
of the Talmud and long after its completion, rabbis and learned men maintained
the relevance of Jewish law by continuing to ponder and interpret each
sentence, each word, of their holy texts, and by passing their knowledge and
their passion for Torah to their communities and to the generations that
followed them. In this way, rabbinic Judaism must be understood as a
decidedly intergenerational enterprise, sustained by the devoted practices of
study, conversation, and dispute.25
Likewise, immersed in the seemingly endless project of deciphering the
Constitution’s most intricate details, judges are a paradigmatic
intergenerational community. When citing precedent, the Supreme Court states
“we held”—even when the prior decision is 150 years old. Of course, this
interconnectedness is partially due to the power vested in the judiciary as an
institution. Supreme Court justices interpret with authority, not simply with
faith. Under the right circumstances, their predecessors’ statements and
assertions are binding law in the present day—not simply the utterances of
individuals long gone. But judges’ connectedness to the past goes beyond mere
compulsion. Certainly, as its frequent doctrinal about-faces demonstrate, the
Supreme Court does not owe blind allegiance to past mandates,
notwithstanding the doctrine of stare decisis. The relationship of current
justices to their antecedents is more complex, more nuanced. Judges see
themselves as part of a tradition—not merely as heirs to power, hoping to
legitimize their inheritance. They appear to converse with generations before
them about the details and technicalities of constitutional law. This dialogic
aspect of the intergenerational community of judges is, perhaps, most evident
in the way that judges pick up on important—but nonbinding—dissents from
previous generations in order to locate themselves within a line of judicial
continuity. Take, for instance, Justice Thomas’s recent attempts to place
25. We should note, however, that Jewish tradition strongly emphasizes the education
of all its (male) children, not only those who will become rabbis.
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himself in the company of Justice Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson (and, through Justice Harlan, in the company of the litigators of
Brown):
But I am quite comfortable in the company I keep. My view of the
Constitution is Justice Harlan’s view in Plessy: “Our Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.” And my view
was the rallying cry for the lawyers who litigated Brown. . . . (“Marshall had a
‘Bible’ to which he turned during his most depressed moments. The ‘Bible’
would be known in the legal community as the first Mr. Justice Harlan’s
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson. I do not know of any opinion which buoyed
Marshall more in his pre-Brown days . . .”).26

Judges, then, are a self-consciously intergenerational community—bound
by power but also by tradition and faith.27 What is more, the work that judges
do to transmit and preserve technical details across generations is essential to
the continuity of the entire constitutional project. If judges (and lawyers and
legal scholars) did not scrutinize the details of the Constitution, those details
would cease to matter—and the Constitution would lose substantial power over
time. Numerous scholars have pointed out an analogy between priests and
judges, as keepers and ultimate arbiters of the constitutional faith.28 The
analogy works at least as well for rabbis, whose legalistic—yet faith-based—
arguments over biblical text fill the pages of the Talmud and continue to
reinforce the connections between modern Jews and the practices of
generations past.
B.   The Problem of Formalism
Ongoing arguments over details can thus breathe life into old texts.
However, the way in which these details are discussed can fundamentally shape
the character of the faith community. Here, the wise son’s question indicates a
particularly formalist approach to faith. While his “wicked” and “simple”
brothers speak of meaning, the wise son asks only about what the law is, not
what it should be.
Legal formalism is “[t]he theory that law is a set of rules and principles
independent of other political and social institutions.”29 Legal formalists do not
entangle themselves in a normative inquiry into the desirability of those rules;
rather, if the rules were established through a legitimate process, the role of
judges is to faithfully interpret—not question or rewrite—those laws. Under a
formalist vision, “the realms of the ethical, the political, and of value in general

26. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 772-73
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
27. Ronald Dworkin would understand them as co-authors of one enormous “chain
novel.” See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228-32 (1986).
28. See infra note 45.
29. Legal formalism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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are the threats to the law’s integrity.”30 Law, in other words, should be
autonomous from interpretation—because interpretation is malleable, too easily
manipulated by individuals with authority to serve their own purposes.
Formalism relies upon a baseline of faith in law, since it relinquishes the act of
interpretation that might otherwise redeem it; and indeed, formalism is a
common way of keeping faith with an old and venerated tradition that may
frequently conflict with modernity.
The religious equivalent to the formalist is the fundamentalist.31
Fundamentalists espouse that humans should strictly adhere to God’s word,
without amending it through new (and mere mortal) conceptions of
“morality”—a similar position to formalism, likewise grounded upon faith in
the closed universe of existing law. Taking this approach, the wise son—alone
of all the sons—affirms his belief in God’s role as promulgator of the Jewish
legal system: “What are the testimonies and statutes and ordinances which the
Lord our God commanded you?” The wise son assumes the legitimacy of the
rules; they were given by God. Within that coherent set of laws, the question of
meaning, of normative inquiry, is unnecessary. Indeed, the wise son asks
nothing of the justness, or even the significance, of the laws of Passover. It is a
believer’s role to decipher what the law is, and to follow that law. The
justification for the law is, quite simply, that it comes from God.
We can gain a more nuanced portrait of traditional Jewish understanding of
formalism by emphasizing the difference between keva and kavana. Keva is
mechanical repetition—it is praying three times a day, following the letter of
the laws of kashrut, and so forth. Kavana is spiritual enlightenment that
sometimes breaks through these mechanics—the transcendence that only
emerges through practice. The wise son is well versed in this distinction; we
see him striving to master keva before he expects to find kavana. In a similar
vein, there is a famous midrash (Rabbinic story) that God offered the Torah to
the Jewish people only after offering it to all the other nations. Each nation
noted amendments it wanted to make, or refused to agree to its terms. The
Jewish people, however, consented freely with the words, “Na’aseh
v’nishmah—We will do, and we will hear.”32 This promise to fulfill the
obligations before even hearing what they were, let alone understanding them
fully or agreeing with them on a personal level, is a central tenet of Jewish
faith—and similarly characterizes the faith of the wise son.

30. Stanley Fish, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in CLOSURE OR
CRITIQUE: NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL THEORY 157, 159 (Alan Norrie ed., 1993).
31. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “fundamentalism” as “[a] religious
movement . . . based on strict adherence to certain tenets (e.g. the literal inerrancy of
Scripture) held to be fundamental to the Christian faith” and “[i]n other religions, esp. Islam,
a similarly strict adherence to ancient or fundamental doctrines, with no concessions to
modern developments in thought or customs.” Fundamentalism, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/75498 (last visited June 7, 2015).
32. Deuteronomy 5:27 (author’s translation).
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Of course, many Jewish scholars—like many constitutional scholars—
object to a purely formalist reading of Jewish law.33 As strong as the tradition
of obedience to the letter of the law, Judaism contains an equally strong
tradition of challenging the meaning of the laws and even God himself.34 I will
delve deeper into the critiques of formalism in both Judaism and
constitutionalism in Part IV.B, infra, discussing the wicked son. For now, I will
only stress that the wise son shows how faith and formalism easily go hand in
hand; how a system of faith-based law can lead in the direction of
fundamentalism. We have witnessed precisely that movement in constitutional
law, with the Rehnquist Revolution and the rise in influence of Justice Scalia.
Formalism may present concerns even for true believers, who may fear that
misdirected attention to the letter of the law can take attention away from—or
even pervert—its spirit or broader meaning. Formalism may be even more
problematic in a diverse faith-based community—where not everyone believes,
and where people are as likely to call constitutional faith “idolatry” as
“religion.”
C.   The Detachment of the Elite
I described above the faith-reinforcing role of the wise sons in both
Judaism and American constitutionalism. But to what extent is their faith—
particularly when expressed in such formalist terms—merely passed on within
an elite sub-community, hopelessly detached from the People? Note how
differently the father answers his wise son than the rest of his children. The
other three children are reminded of the Exodus from Egypt—of the Jewish
people’s freedom, writ large. In answering the wise son, however, the father
discusses not freedom but technicalities. Has the wise son moved beyond his
need to be reminded of the big picture, or has he forgotten it in his
preoccupation with the details? If the latter is true, can the wise son effectively
converse with the rest of his community, who approach their faith in markedly
different terms?
Indeed, one may readily ask whether the wise son—like the wicked son—
shows detachment from his community as he poses his question. The father
sharply rebukes the wicked son for “excluding” himself from his community by
asking, “What is this service to you?” Yet the wise son’s question similarly
situates him as an outsider: “What are the testimonies and statutes and
ordinances which the Lord our God commanded you?” Both children ask for
information about a practice they have indicated is strange to them. Some

33. See, e.g., DAVID HARTMAN, A LIVING COVENANT: THE INNOVATIVE SPIRIT IN
TRADITIONAL JUDAISM 1 (1985) (noting that “Judaism has been accused of ‘legalism,’
meaning a concern with externals and lack of inward passion. It has been identified with
formalism and soulless regimentation” and the setting forth an alternative vision).
34. See infra Part IV.B.
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haggadot, discomfited by the wise son’s terminology, actually change the
language of his question in order to reflect a more inclusive attitude.35
However, two factors make the wise son’s question less offensive to the
father. First, the wise son does not fully exclude himself from the community
as the wicked son does. He characterizes Jewish law as commanded by “our
God,” thus locating himself at a starting point of belief in God and, by
extension, in the Jewish people as a community of faith.36 Second, because his
question is posed in intellectual terms, the wise son’s resemblance of the
wicked son goes unnoticed. The wicked son’s question can be read as a
challenge, as a rebuff to Judaism as a whole; the wise son’s question emerges
from a place of intellectual curiosity. But might this not, too, be a signal of
detachment—of a legalistic mindset interfering with the wise son’s emotional
ties to his community?
In my reading of the wise son, then, his question simultaneously indicates
faith and detachment. His fundamental faith is strong: he believes in God, in
the Jewish project as a whole. Yet he maintains a curious distance from the
community—a distance for which his father does not chastise him, so
preoccupied is he with answering the technical question his son asks.
Again we see a similarity between the legal elite and the wise son. Just as
the answer to the wise son’s question is markedly different than the responses
to the other three, there is a substantial disconnect between the legal elite and
the People—both in terms of the questions that matter to them and the kinds of
answers that speak to them. Lawyers may be concerned about the scope of the
Commerce Clause; the People are simply concerned about the scope of
freedom, unfiltered through any technical lens. Moreover, judges and
academics—like the wise son—demonstrate simultaneous faith in and
detachment from their community. Both judges and academics are
independent—isolated from the political community, even as they are the
guardians of constitutional faith. The project of law, many argue, affirmatively
requires detachment. Gretchen Craft, for instance, argues that law should be
distant so as to serve the human need for order over chaos.37 Others disagree
with her perspective—including scholars, such as Patricia Williams, who have
tried to reintroduce narrative and emotion to legal scholarship and practice.38
Whatever may be normatively desirable, however, few would disagree that
35. RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY, supra note 14, at 39 (“While the biblical verse reads
etkhem, ‘you,’ this Haggadah follows the Jerusalem Talmud, and some texts of the Mekhilta,
in its use of the word otanu, ‘us.’ This clarifies the difference between the wise child and the
wicked child, for then the wise child explicitly includes himself in the community, while the
wicked child conspicuously excludes himself.”).
36. ISRAEL STEIN, THE GEDOLEI YISROEL HAGGADAH 44 (1995) (“Keren Yeshuah
points out that the wise son’s question contains a hidden declaration of faith in
Hashem . . . .”).
37. Gretchen Craft, The Persistence of Dread in Law and Literature, 102 YALE L.J.
521 (1992).
38. See generally PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY
OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991).
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judges and scholars are, to a large degree, detached from the “common man” in
America—which may be particularly ironic given judges’ proclivity to
pronounce national values.
Given this disconnect, can judges effectively preserve a faith in the
Constitution—not only within a small circle of elites bound tightly across
generations, but also within an intergenerational, national community? At the
very least, judges need to understand that the majority of Americans will be
“simple sons”—that they will evaluate their Constitution by the straightforward
question, “What is this?” To more effectively preserve a broader community of
faith, judges should justify their actions by attempting to speak to the whole
community, and not only to their fellow wise sons.
How does Jewish tradition counter the detachment of the elite? By
celebrating and, more, obligating teaching—by emphasizing public reading of
the Torah, participation, and learning. In other words, by trying to bring the
People closer to the wise sons. In America, this may seem like an unlikely
solution, given the problems of our public education system. But I am certainly
not the first to maintain that education leads to a sense of citizenship,
participation, and commitment.39 Rabbi Auerbach—without, perhaps,
adequately acknowledging the detachment of Judaism’s “wise sons” from their
communities—contrasts the detachment of the legal elite with the participatory
ethic of Judaism.40 Preserving the Jewish focus on education has become a
much more difficult struggle in modern times, as assimilation and secularism
are on the rise. Today, the Jewish community faces the same struggle as the
American community—how to retain the expertise of the “wise sons” without
alienating the rest of the community, which experiences competing moral

39. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Marshall, J. dissenting); see also STEVE FARKAS ET AL.,
NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER, KNOWING IT BY HEART: AMERICANS CONSIDER THE
CONSTITUTION AND ITS MEANING 39 (2002), available at http://www.constitutioncenter.org/
CitizenAction/CivicResearchResults/asset_upload_file173_2678.pdf.
40. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, RABBIS AND LAWYERS: THE JOURNEY FROM TORAH TO
CONSTITUTION 45-46 (1990) (“The principle of communal responsibility is reinforced by the
understanding that the Torah is not only law but instruction as well. It conveyed the
obligation to teach its principles so that future generations, ‘who have not known anything,’
would learn. . . . The law was not only a written text, but a continuing source of communal
instruction. To this day the reading of the Torah, at the core of every Sabbath and holy day
observance, affirms a communal obligation to hear, to learn, and to do. Each generation of
Jews can thereby return to the covenantal moment and reexperience it. The Constitution, by
contrast, remains far more distant, even inaccessible. It speaks almost exclusively to
governing institutions, rather than the community. It long ago became the virtually exclusive
preserve of legal specialists, who continue to monopolize the debate over its meaning. Their
interpretive mastery makes it much less accessible to ordinary citizens except during
relatively rare moments of focused public debate over a controversial issue. A public reading
of the Constitution can hardly be imagined . . . .”).
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imperatives aside from their religious beliefs, and insufficient time, resources,
or interest to devote themselves to learning.41
III.   THE SIMPLE SON
The simple son—what does he say? “What is this?” And you shall say to him:
“By strength of hand the Lord brought us out of Egypt, from the house of
bondage.”
The simple son’s question is—unsurprisingly—straightforward. He has
neither the wise son’s complexity to understand details, nor the wicked son’s
temerity to challenge meaning. However, commentators have frequently paired
the simple son with the wise son: “[B]oth the wise son and the simple son ask
questions, each at his level of understanding. Their questions reveal their desire
to understand how [God] expects them to observe Pesach.”42
The model answer to the simple son focuses on unity and on freedom. It is
the only one of the four responses that uses the plural first person voice: “the
Lord brought us out of Egypt”—us and not me. The father thus comforts the
simple son by reinforcing his sense that he is part of a community. Knowing
that this son will not grasp the technicalities that absorb the wise son, the father
also speaks in broad terms about the purpose of the festival: it is to celebrate
the redemption from slavery—to celebrate freedom.
Who is the simple son in American constitutionalism? The clearest answer
is the American people, writ large. I should take care to note, however, that
under this analogy “simple” does not mean stupid, but rather refers to those
who possess less complex, less technical knowledge of the Constitution—those
who do not know the nooks and crannies of our constitutional order. Despite
this apparent simplicity, Americans do seem to have a firm and deeply
ingrained sense of the importance of the Constitution and the significance of its
basic precepts—such as liberty, free speech, and equality. According to a study
conducted by the National Constitution Center,
Several previous research studies on the Constitution have made two things
clear: Most Americans prize their Constitution and most often don’t even
know the basic facts about it. . . . But what became abundantly clear in focus
group after focus group is that Americans, as if by second nature, are actually
quite comfortable with the values and principles embodied in the Constitution.
Beneath a surface ignorance of what each Amendment says typically lies an
internalized understanding of the rights and principles it guarantees.43

In this sense, the average American certainly interacts with the
Constitution differently than does the wise son, but that difference does not

41. See infra Part III.B for further discussion of the relationship between the People
and the wise son.
42. STEIN, supra note 36, at 45.
43. FARKAS, supra note 39, at 14.
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predicate a diminished faith. The American simple son, like his Jewish analog,
shares the wise son’s commitment to the constitutional project as a whole.
Also, just as the father responds to the simple son by using the inclusive
first person plural, Americans as a whole do not seem to struggle either with
their sense of belonging or with their allegiance to what they consider a
fundamentally decent and free constitutional society. As the National
Constitution Center’s study noted, “Historians and constitutional scholars
sometimes remind us of the limitations of the original document—especially its
compromise on slavery—but according to typical Americans ‘We the People’
refers to all Americans, regardless of race, gender or creed.”44
The simple son, then, is a reminder of the baseline of faith in America: a
non-technical, non-disruptive, but nonetheless genuinely-held and powerful
faith in the overarching principles of the American Constitution.
A.   The Constitution as Symbol
A key element of simple faith is symbolism. And indeed, the poetry of the
verse of Torah used in response to the simple son is particularly captivating.
Compare this verse—“By strength of hand the Lord brought us out of Egypt,
from the house of bondage”—with the verse used to respond to the wicked
son—“It is because of what the Lord did for me when I came out of Egypt.” In
responding to the simple son, the father is a more artful storyteller, using
evocative language and imagery to reach the son. He sets up a world of
symbols and meaning to express the broad import of freedom and of
community. There is a national narrative here—something to capture the minds
of non-legalistic (but also non-rebellious) people. In short, it’s the kind of
redemptive story you’d hear in civics class.
Like the simple son, the American people relate to their nation through
symbols and through tropes of community (patriotism) and freedom (the land
of liberty). Dramatically, after September 11, 2001, freedom and unity emerged
as key themes preoccupying the American people. And Americans have long
held special reverence for symbols of the nation. Supreme Court justices, as
guardians of the Constitution, have frequently been cast in a symbolic, priestlike light45—an aura that they somehow have retained despite frequent blows
44. Id. at 9.
45. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 16-17 (“There is more than one theorist who

views the Supreme Court as the authoritative ‘church’ built upon the ‘rock’ of the
Constitution, and the Court’s pronouncements therefore as ‘the keys to the kingdom’ of the
heavenly status of a country ruled ‘by law’ instead of people.”) (footnotes omitted); John B.
Attanasio, Everyman’s Constitutional Law: A Theory of the Power of Judicial Review, 72
GEO. L.J. 1665, 1701 (1984) (“[I]n the fashion of a secular church, the Court fulfills the
fundamental need for moral certitude in American society.”); Max Lerner, Constitution and
Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1312 (1937) (“[W]e transfer our sense of the
definitive and timeless character of the Constitution to the judges who expound it. . . . The
judges become, thus, not ordinary men, subject to ordinary passions, but ‘discoverers’ of
final truth, priests in the service of a godhead.”).
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to their image of semi-divinity (or even basic legitimacy).46 The flag, too, is an
enduring symbol: Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Texas v. Johnson,
wrote that
[t]he American flag . . . throughout more than 200 years of our history, has
come to be the visible symbol embodying our Nation. . . . The flag is not
simply another “idea” or “point of view” competing for recognition in the
marketplace of ideas. Millions and millions of Americans regard it with an
almost mystical reverence regardless of what sort of social, political, or
philosophical beliefs they may have.47

The Pledge of Allegiance encapsulates the prominence of symbolism,
unity, and liberty in the American psyche. Repeated daily in schools across the
country—in one of the few public pronouncements of faith akin to public
readings of the Torah—the Pledge emphasizes symbolism (the flag), unity
(“one nation . . . indivisible”), and freedom (“with liberty and justice for all”).
Overshadowing both flag and Court, the Constitution itself is the central
symbol of the American people’s faith. Certainly, the simple son’s lack of
detailed knowledge about the Constitution has not led to its decreasing
importance in popular discourse. Rather, a primary function of symbols is to
stand in for expertise, and the Constitution-as-symbol is strong as ever within
popular American culture. It is a central article of American faith—appealing to
emotion and values, not merely rationality—and it therefore takes up a primary
place in people’s identities as Americans and as humans. Holding belief in the
Constitution, Americans want it to fit into their broader world viewpoint, and
more, want their viewpoints to fit into the Constitution. To understand the
central symbolic role of the Constitution in popular discourse, we need only
look to the culture wars of our time. Americans load their ethical commitments
onto the text of the Constitution; despite the pushes in recent memory for a
Federal Marriage Amendment or an Anti-Flag Burning Amendment, most
Americans want to locate their moral imperatives within the Constitution,
rather than to amend it. Everyone wants a piece of the sacred constitutional
text; everyone wants to locate her side on “God’s side.”48 Politics has become
constitutionalized where deep matters of conscience or conviction are
implicated. Indeed, throughout American history, the Constitution has emerged
as a particularly potent symbol and rallying cry when culture clashes have been

46. The conflict between Court and President during the New Deal era posed perhaps
the greatest threat to the Court’s legitimacy and, indeed, almost destroyed it. Max Lerner,
writing in the height of that drama, provides a fascinating glimpse into a contemporary
understanding of the danger to the Court’s symbolic place in the American constitutional
order. See Lerner, supra note 45, at 1314-15. Yet for all Lerner’s predictions of decline, the
Court has retained its symbolic significance (despite a simultaneous recognition of
politicking on the bench) and even more, has steadily increased its power.
47. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 429 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
48. See Jack M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1704 (1997); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the
Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 322-26 (2001).
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most divisive—and, perhaps, least reconcilable by a straightforward reading of
preexisting text.49
Given the People’s scant knowledge of the words of the Constitution,
compounded by their strong feeling of its significance, the Constitution can be
an accordion-like instrument that may be stretched and compressed in order to
cohere with the People’s larger sensibilities. This flexibility is particularly
alluring for ordinary citizens because they are not trying to accomplish the
Herculean task of fitting one line of doctrine, or one line of text, into a doctrinal
whole. For the simple son, details fade into the background, while substantive
imperatives and the utility the Constitution as a political tool sharpen into
focus.
When faith is thus built around symbols that evoke fidelity to broad
principles but clarify few concrete details, it is unsurprising that much of the
Constitutional text, itself, will often be lost or misinterpreted. The simple son of
American constitutionalism has faith in the Constitution as a whole without a
complete understanding of what the Constitution actually says. This
combination of deep faith and relatively unschooled knowledge allows people
to make claims about the Constitution that have important political
consequences, without being fully bound by precedent or text. Ordinary
Americans often fill in these gaps in knowledge of text through their own
understanding of their nation and its values, or through their own sense of right
and wrong, rather than through a detailed historical inquiry. They follow the
emotional trajectory of symbols, rather than the logic of text. This can lead to
broad—and sometimes inaccurate—expectations of what the Constitution
means. For instance, a FindLaw.com survey found that
many Americans identified certain rights as being explicitly granted by the
Constitution and its amendments when, in fact, they are not. For example, 78
percent of Americans believe that the right to vote is guaranteed by the
Constitution . . . . Sixty-eight percent of Americans believe the pursuit of
happiness is a constitutionally protected right . . . . Similarly, 28 percent of
Americans believe there is a right to public education in the Constitution,
while 12 percent believe there is a constitutional right to housing and a right to
health care.50

I should note, however, that while the simple son has misconceptions
about text; these misconceptions are not necessarily arbitrary. The People have

49. Max Lerner describes pre-Civil War constitutional fidelity in these terms: “But in
the thickest of the battle, the Constitution itself went unquestioned. In fact, the more hotly
the diverse interpretations of it were contested, the more unwaveringly did both sides pay
homage to it.” This steadfast constitutional devotion represented an “attempt to solve
national problems through constitutional symbols; and the attempt was a failure.” Lerner,
supra note 45, at 1301. In other words, the band-aid fix of unifying faith in the Constitution
ultimately could not cover the deep divisions over how this Constitution was being
interpreted; and Civil War ensued.
50. Press Release, FindLaw.com, Are Americans Right About Their Constitutional
Rights? (Sept. 18, 2006), available at http://company.findlaw.com/pr/2006/091806.
constitution.html.
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the most intimate understanding of what America actually means—and of what
the Constitution’s promise should mean. Those rights that are deeply rooted in
the nation’s history—such as public education and the ballot—may not be
enshrined in the text of the Constitution, but they are fundamental parts of the
American culture of democracy; it is not surprising that ordinary Americans
would understand them to be constitutionally protected. Indeed, with time,
many of the rights that Americans assume they already have do, in fact,
become constitutionalized. I turn now to introduce this process of popular
influence on authoritative constitutional doctrine.
B.   The People’s Constitution
As mentioned above, we can understand the simple son and the wise son as
allied in the project of constitutional faith. Both sons ponder, essentially, the
same question: what is the law? Both have a relatively unquestioning belief in
the validity of the constitutional project and the relevance of law to their own
lives. While their underlying faith is thus similar, the outward expression of
that faith is quite different. The faith of the legal elite is mediated through the
rhetoric of text and rationality, while the simple son understands overarching
principles. The simple son asks, “What is this?”—he thinks of the constitutional
project holistically, without considering textual details that might obscure
substantive meaning.
The difference between the preoccupations of wise and simple son is,
perhaps, most dramatically displayed in the abortion context. The abortion
controversy has produced tremendous popular mobilization around the
Constitution by actors on both sides of the debate who are not constitutional
experts, as well as decisions of enormous legal consequence by the judiciary
and prolific commentary by the legal academy. The academy is largely
concerned with technical flaws in Roe v. Wade and its progeny that minimize
judicial legitimacy, and mediate substantive concerns about the outcome of
abortion cases through the language of methodological principle. Popular
abortion movements have capitalized on some of these expert arguments—
criticizing, for instance, judicial overreaching—but their focus remains directed
toward the substance of the rights and wrongs of abortion. “Although law
professors may care deeply about professional questions of judicial technique,
citizens who have mobilized against Roe care chiefly about matters of
substance.”51

51. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 378 (2007); see also id. at 410-11 (“Although it
is commonly asserted that Roe rage was a response to judicial overreaching, a number of
historians have demonstrated that political mobilization against the liberalization of abortion
began well before Roe and challenged all efforts, both legislative and adjudicative, to reform
criminal abortion laws. Americans who entered politics to oppose Roe were concerned
primarily about the substantive law of abortion, not about questions of judicial technique or
even about the proper role of courts in a democracy.”).
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The constitutional project depends on the expression of both types of
faith—wise and simple, technical and substantive. While the authority to
pronounce the law and the expertise to make complex textual claims about the
Constitution rests firmly in the hands of the elite, the Constitution is also a
popular document—a Covenant with the People—and its persisting
significance requires both the fidelity and the substantive contributions of the
People. As such, the simple son, despite his lack of sophistication, manages to
influence and converse with the savvier wise son. Earlier, I asserted that the
wise son stands in danger of being too detached from the common people.52 He
speaks a technocratic language that his simple brother cannot fully access. But
this gap is not a hermetic seal; neither son can fully ignore the other. And the
simple son has tools to place pressure on the wise son’s aloofness.
The evolution of constitutional law tracks a precarious balance between the
wise son’s textual exegeses and the simple son’s sense of right and wrong. This
balance is also evident in the abortion context, in which popular resistance to
Roe v. Wade has undeniably impacted abortion doctrine,53 even as the Court
has clung to stare decisis, the most self-referential tool at its disposal.54 For
Robert Post and Reva Siegel, this back-and-forth between court and citizenry—
between wise son and simple son—retains the democratic legitimacy of the
constitutional project as a whole. They call this balance between the wise son’s
technocratic role and the simple son’s popular role “democratic
constitutionalism”:
Democratic constitutionalism affirms the role of representative government
and mobilized citizens in enforcing the Constitution at the same time as it
affirms the role of courts in using professional legal reason to interpret the
Constitution. Unlike popular constitutionalism, democratic constitutionalism
does not seek to take the Constitution away from courts. Democratic
constitutionalism recognizes the essential role of judicially enforced
constitutional rights in the American polity. Unlike a juricentric focus on
courts, democratic constitutionalism appreciates the essential role that public
engagement plays in guiding and legitimating the institutions and practices of
judicial review. Constitutional judgments based on professional legal reason
can acquire democratic legitimacy only if professional reason is rooted in
popular values and ideals. Democratic constitutionalism observes that
adjudication is embedded in a constitutional order that regularly invites
exchange between officials and citizens over questions of constitutional
meaning.55

In other words, the wise son needs the simple son’s investment in the
constitutional values in order to retain the relevance of his own technical work.
The simple son, moreover, is the constant reminder to the wise son that pure
formalism is insufficient. The father must be able to answer the simple son—

52.
53.
54.
55.

See supra Part II.C.
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Post & Siegel, supra note 51, at 379.
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the status of law cannot be so technical and so unreachable that it cannot be
condensed and understood by the common man. Post and Siegel advocate
increasing the points of connection between wise and simple son, to facilitate
these productive interchanges and enhance the democratic legitimacy and
viability of the Constitution.56
Recent scholarship on popular constitutionalism has advocated a more
extreme recalibration of the power dynamics between wise and simple son,
highlighting the importance of public participation in defining the meaning of
the Constitution, at the expense of judicial supremacy. Popular
constitutionalists seek not only to make law more legitimate, but also to free
law from the technical—and anachronistic—obsessions of the legal elite. In
arguing against judicial supremacy, Jeremy Waldron notes his dissatisfaction
with the wise son, who must sacrifice attention to substance so as to preserve
his ability to speak authoritatively about text:
[C]ourts will tend to be distracted in their arguments about rights by side
arguments about how a text like the Bill of Rights is best approached by
judges. American experience bears this out: The proportion of argument about
theories of interpretation to direct argument about the moral issues is skewed
in most judicial opinions in a way that no one who thinks the issues
themselves are important can possibly regard as satisfactory. This is partly
because the legitimacy of judicial review is itself so problematic. Because
judges (like the rest of us) are concerned about the legitimacy of a process that
permits them to decide these issues, they cling to their authorizing texts and
debate their interpretation rather than venturing out to discuss moral reasons
directly.57

Likewise, Larry Kramer advocates that the People should reclaim their rightful
ownership over the Constitution. As he sees it, the legal elites have succeeded
in usurping the Constitution, at least in part because they have clothed the
Constitution in technicalities that make it appear inaccessible to the common
man.
[T]o control the Supreme Court, we must first lay claim to the Constitution
ourselves. That means . . . refusing to be deflected by arguments that
constitutional law is too complex or difficult for ordinary citizens.
Constitutional law is indeed complex, for legitimating judicial authority has
offered an excuse to emphasize technical requirements of precedent and legal
argument that necessarily complicated matters. But this complexity was
created by the Court for the Court and is itself a product of judicializing
constitutional law. In reclaiming the Constitution, we reclaim the
Constitution’s legacy as, in Franklin D. Roosevelt [sic] words, “a layman’s

56. Id. at 380-81 (“More persistent and nuanced forms of exchange are required to
maintain the authority of those who enforce constitutional law in situations of aggravated
dispute. Democratic constitutionalism examines the many practices that facilitate an ongoing
and continuous communication between courts and the public. These practices must be
robust enough to prevent constitutional alienation and to maintain solidarity in a normatively
heterogeneous community.”).
57. Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346, 1381 (2006).
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instrument of government” and not “a lawyer’s contract.” Above all, it means
insisting that the Supreme Court is our servant and not our master: a servant
whose seriousness and knowledge deserves much deference, but who is
ultimately supposed to yield to our judgments about what the Constitution
means and not the reverse. The Supreme Court is not the highest authority in
the land on constitutional law. We are.58

Of course, other scholars staunchly oppose this revival of popular
constitutionalism. For instance, L. A. Powe, Jr., offers a strong critique of
Kramer’s vision.59 Detailing a history of popular constitutional mobilization in
the Twentieth Century—including resistance to the Court’s decisions on
segregation, school prayer, busing, and abortion—Powe challenges Kramer’s
conclusion that popular constitutionalism is currently being undermined.
Moreover, given the character of the instances of popular constitutionalism he
identifies, Powe questions the desirability of popular resistance to Supreme
Court. “It may be, contrary to Kramer’s position, both that we still have popular
constitutionalism and that we would be better off without it.”60
Scholars may argue interminably about the ideal power dynamic between
expertise and democracy, between judicial supremacy and popular
constitutionalism, between wise son and simple son. Indeed, this is a debate
that has been ongoing in constitutional law since Marbury v. Madison.61 For
now, I simply note that the average American, unversed in constitutional law,
but invested in the constitutional project, offers a measure of counterbalance to
the professional legal elite; and that sometimes, whether through mobilized
political pressure, Senate confirmation hearings, or the power of norm
evolution over time, the simple son succeeds in undermining the exclusive
authority of the Court or, even more, swaying the elite toward his principled
conception of law.
IV.   THE WICKED SON
The wicked one—what does he say? “What is this service to you?”—‘to you,’
not to him! Because he has excluded himself from the group, he has repudiated
the foundation. Therefore set his teeth on edge and say to him: “It is because of
what the Lord did for me when I came out of Egypt”—for me, and not for him.
If he had been there he would not have been redeemed.
If the simple son is the foil to the wise son’s punctiliousness, the wicked
son is the foil to the wise son’s placidity. While the wise son speaks in
technicalities, the wicked son is traditionally understood to speak in offensive
58. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 247-48 (2004).
59. L. A. Powe, Jr., Are “the People” Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?,
83 TEX. L. REV. 855 (2005) (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 58).
60. Id. at 857.
61. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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and dismissive generalities. He rebelliously challenges his father to justify his
belief, rather than seeking to understand the practices of his tradition. And, as
the text emphasizes, the wicked son’s greatest sin is to exclude himself from his
community. The father responds to his son’s detachment not by encouraging
him to come back toward the community he has rejected, but by “set[ting] his
teeth on edge”—by cementing his son’s exclusion through fear and anger, by
retroactively barring him from redemption. In modern times, some have found
the father’s attitude toward his “wicked” child to be rather unjust, and have
suggested new ways of understanding this son. After all, the words that are
construed as a rejection of his community are little different than those spoken
by the wise son—why is it that this son is rebuked so sharply? And, perhaps
more importantly, his question may be less a rebellion than a search for
meaning; he is delving beneath his religion’s surface practices and easy
answers; he is struggling with his faith and seeking to understand how others in
his community sustain theirs. Certainly, some commentators have interpreted
the wicked son’s “question” as a confrontation, not a true inquiry.62 But in a
modern, secularizing world, efforts to seek or simply to challenge meaning
seem entirely natural and even laudable.
The archetypal wicked son provides insight into two different problems
faced by our constitutional faith community: exclusion and disbelief. America
is a diverse nation, encompassing people with divergent viewpoints on and
experiences of the Constitution. If the American legal system rests on an
underpinning of faith, how does the nonbeliever fit into the scheme? The more
the nation’s constitutive commitments rest on faith, the more alienating the
polity becomes for those who don’t believe. Even more problematically, what
happens to those who have been subjugated by the very system we revere?
Need they profess faith that may be undeserved, or risk being self-ostracized
even as they have been excluded in the past? Once offered a modicum of
equality, must the downtrodden erase the memory of their own humiliation and
assimilate to the majority in order to one day become a part of the polity?
I thus identify and explore two distinct—though related—American
“wicked sons”: first, those who have been excluded from the promise of the
American constitutional order, and second, those who, whether due to their
own exclusion or due to a sense of the system’s larger injustice, reject its worth
and legitimacy. “Wicked sons” may react to these experiences of exclusion and
injustice in a range of ways, but I identify two significant and predictable
responses. The first is to recognize a core, redeemable set of values within the
constitutional order that makes the project of constitutional reform a
worthwhile one—that sees injustice as an aberration from core constitutional

62. STEIN, supra note 36, at 45 (“The wicked son . . . has no desire to ask or to
understand. On the contrary, his whole purpose is to contradict and criticize, and he phrases
his ‘question’ in the form of a confrontation. . . . When it comes to the wicked son . . . the
Torah does not say that he asks you but rather that he tells you, as it says, ‘It shall be when
your sons say to you, “What is this service to you?”’”).
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principles rather than a product of those principles. The second is to see the
constitutional order as so corrupted and tainted that the Constitution is no
longer a project worth fighting for and the American polity a community not
worth belonging to.
C.   The Problem of Exclusion
The story of Passover is one of communal exodus from slavery to freedom.
Modern Jews trying to identify with this story of redemption face a temporal
gap: they must connect with long-ago ancestors who were freed from bondage
and supposedly covenanted with God to obey the Torah. In response, legend
has served to incorporate future generations into the founding act of consent.
According to a well-known midrash:
All Jews, those living at the time and those as yet unborn, are assumed to have
stood at Sinai to receive the Torah. The giving of the law not only created the
nation at a particular moment in time, but bound Jews in perpetuity to that
covenantal experience. That conception of command and compliance,
embracing all future generations, helps to explain how law could continue to
define Jewish life within a communal setting long after the foundations of
national sovereignty had been destroyed.63

Bending the limits of time and space, this midrash of intergenerational
unity at Mount Sinai serves to make all Jews witnesses; to bind all generations
not only by obligation but also by consent.
While Jews thus face, and have attempted to overcome, a generation gap,
the problem of intra-generational disconnect is far less salient than in the
history of the American Constitution. This is not to say that there are no tropes
of exclusion within the Jewish faith. Women have different obligations (and,
consequently, different options) than do men in orthodox Judaism. Indeed, the
very story of the Four Sons is gendered and excludes the experience of women
and girls.64 Jewish feminists have responded to such exclusion by, for instance,
adding traditions to the seder—such as emphasizing Miriam’s role in the
Exodus and placing an orange on the seder plate65—to remind seder
participants of voices too often silenced within the Jewish community.
However, there is no intra-generational exclusion polluting the story of the
Founding itself. When the Children of Israel (including unborn generations) are
said to have “consented” to God’s offer of the Torah, they are said to have
spoken as one to accept the obligations of God’s law. There were no dissenting
voices, nor people who were excluded from participation but nonetheless
bound by the Covenant. The Jews are an insular people; as such, they are

63. AUERBACH, supra note 40, at 45.
64. It is worth considering how the pedagogical tale might be different if it centered

around a mother speaking to her daughters.
65. The orange is “a symbol of inclusion of gays and lesbians and others who are
marginalized within the Jewish community.” Tamara Cohen, Orange on the Seder Plate,
RITUALWELL, http://www.ritualwell.org/ritual/orange-seder-plate (last visited June 9, 2015).
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spared many of the problems of inclusion and exclusion faced by a
multicultural community. The divisions that plague the Jewish community
today—between Hasidic and reform, secular and religious, Israeli and
American—do not derive from a fractured beginning, but rather from a
fragmented trajectory.
Thus in the Jewish tradition, what makes the wicked son so “wicked” is
that his isolation from the community is self-imposed. He is seated at the seder
table; he is—at least formally—part of the community. By virtue of his
ancestry, he would have been redeemed if he had been in Egypt; only his selfexile would have jeopardized his redemption.
By contrast, in the American context, minorities excluded from the original
“We the People” do not need reminding that they would not have been
redeemed at the Founding. Like modern Jews, all modern Americans face a
temporal gap from the Founders; and, as in Judaism, an explanatory legend
tries to overcome the intergenerational disconnect to preserve the viability of
covenant. In the American constitutional tradition, the phrase “We the People”
has itself reached mythological stature: its universal terms would seduce us into
believing that we all consented—past, present, and future.
Yet for many, this idealized account rings false. It is a commonplace within
legal scholarship that, in reality, the universally-phrased “We the People” was
but a small minority of the American people of 1787—white, landowning men.
The American people as a whole did not ratify or even consent to the
Constitution; and the consequences for America’s outsiders have been severe.
Slavery found explicit protection in the Constitution, continued for nearly one
hundred years after its ratification, and was abolished only after a bloody civil
war. Even after the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, Jim Crow
flourished in the South, and black southerners were subjected to a legal system
of racial disenfranchisement, segregation, and discrimination. It took the
struggles of the Civil Rights Movement for formal equality to take hold, and
even after that point, racial inequities remain prevalent in our society. Today’s
war on drugs has led to the physical exclusion from the polity of massive and
disproportionate numbers of black men through incarceration, and their
subsequent political exclusion through felon disenfranchisement laws. The
racial disparities in modern mass incarceration have led some scholars and
advocates to decry the rise of the “New Jim Crow.”66
Nor have America’s outsiders been limited to African Americans. Women
had no right to vote until the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.67 Chinese
immigrants were banned entirely from 1882 to 1943.68 Homosexuals could be

66. E.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
68. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Pub. L. No. 47-71, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealed
by Magnuson Act, Pub. L. No. 78-199, ch. 344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600 (1943).
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criminalized for consensual sex until 2003.69 And the list goes on. According to
the father, the wicked son retroactively excludes himself from his people’s
redemption; but many Americans would need a revisionist history in order to
understand themselves as included at the nation’s birth.
Angela Harris writes powerfully about the fiction of a unified We the
People. She critiques James Boyd White’s description of the “unified and
universal” voice of We the People, which is able to speak
for an entire and united nation and to do so directly and personally, not in the
third person or by merely delegated authority. . . . The instrument . . . appears
to issue from a single imaginary author, consisting of all the people of the
United States, including the reader, merged into a single identity in this act of
self-constitution.70

Harris responds to this characterization by pointing out the voices silenced by
this show of unity:
Despite its claims . . . this voice does not speak for everyone, but for a
political faction trying to constitute itself as a unit of many disparate voices;
its power lasts only as long as the contradictory voices remain silenced. In a
sense, the “I of Funes, who knows only particulars, and the “we” of “We the
People,” who know only generalities, are the same. Both voices are
monologues; both depend on the silence of others. The difference is only that
the first voice knows of no others, while the second has silenced them.71

Moreover, for black women and other minorities within minorities, experiences
of marginalization in the culture at large have—perhaps even more painfully—
been echoed by further marginalization within the very reform movements
crying out against the first injustice:
In feminist legal theory . . . ‘We the People’ seems in danger of being replaced
by “We the Women.” And in feminist legal theory, as in the dominant culture,
it is mostly white, straight, and socioeconomically privileged people who
claim to speak for all of us. Not surprisingly, the story they tell about “women,” despite its claim to universality, seems to black women to be peculiar to
women who are white, straight, and socioeconomically privileged . . . .72

In this context of essentialism and exclusion, the choice before many black
women is not whether to exclude themselves from the community of faith—as
the wicked son purportedly does—but rather whether to reject pieces of
themselves in order to somehow fit into dominant narratives of the larger
“community.” Harris writes, “[A]s long as feminists, like theorists in the
dominant culture, continue to search for gender and racial essences, black
women will never be anything more than a crossroads between two kinds of

69. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
70. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.

REV. 581, 582 (1990) (quoting JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING
240 (1984)).
71. Id. at 582-83.
72. Id. at 588.
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domination, or at the bottom of a hierarchy of oppressions; we will always be
required to choose pieces of ourselves to present as wholeness.”73
Given this marginalization, two points are particularly striking. First—that
in fact, many Americans who were excluded from the original We the People
do not join in the wicked son’s taunts but rather look to the Constitution with
reverence and with hope. Unlike the wicked son—a full member of his
community who excluded himself—numerous Americans who were not
redeemed at the Founding have worked retroactively to incorporate their own
meanings and experiences onto the Constitution, rather than reject the
document that first rejected them. According to a study conducted in 2002,
“[T]he overwhelming majority of African Americans (77%) has faith in the
Constitution and believes its main purpose is to protect and serve all people—in
spite of its imperfect beginnings.”74 Even black radicals and harbingers of
social change have frequently—and, perhaps, “astonishing[ly]”75—placed their
faith in the Constitution though America (and its laws) shunned them:
Having been treated as outsiders all along, blacks confront the Constitution
with an unavoidable option of accepting or rejecting it. Surprisingly, many
prominent black thinkers—even the most radical ones—not only have failed
to reject the Constitution but have made it a highlight of their advocacy. Black
activists from Martin Luther King, Jr. to the Black Panthers have framed their
demands in terms of constitutional rights. While King peacefully insisted that
segregation violated the Constitution, Huey Newton claimed his constitutional
right to bear arms.76

Within this persisting faith, however, lies a challenge, not a blind
adherence to the status quo. The faith of the descendants of slaves is a demand
that America live up to the ideals of the Constitution, not a celebration of its
historical application. Dorothy Roberts writes:
Blacks . . . are not faithful to the Constitution because the Constitution
deserves their allegiance, for it deserves their cynicism, if not their contempt.
They are faithful to the Constitution because black people deserve to be
included in the Constitution’s protections and promises. Blacks’ fidelity to the
Constitution is not a duty, it is a demand—a demand to be counted as full
members of the political community.77

Thus the question posed by the excluded minority is not so different, after
all, from that of the “wicked son.” If there are universal principles that animate
your belief, what does this unjust reality mean to you? The American wicked
son subverts the current state of affairs, but does not reject his faith—the father
misinterprets him and, threatened by his challenges, seeks to cast his son out
from the tradition itself. But this rejection is a mistake, a symptom of fear of

73. Id. at 589.
74. FARKAS, supra note 39, at 11.
75. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Meaning of Blacks’ Fidelity to the Constitution, 65

FORDHAM L. REV. 1761, 1761 (1997).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1762.

2015]

ARCHETYPES OF FAITH

583

counter-narratives, of blindness to the fact that complexity and self-criticism
ultimately make the community stronger, and not weaker.
The Constitution has been used in this way, as an article of faith in the
possible, throughout its history.78 Famously (and aspirationally), Frederick
Douglass argued that slavery violated the Constitution, at a time when the
document’s compromises clearly protected it.79 Other social movements,
including the women’s suffrage moment, have sought to bring excluded groups
into the community through constitutional rhetoric.80 These constitutional
reformers, in some sense “wicked sons,” have in truth retained their faith but
contested the constitutional status quo and, through that contestation,
invigorated the Constitution’s relevance and vitality.81
The second point worth emphasizing in this context of exclusion is the
striking and rapid manner in which histories of subjugation of minority groups
are forgotten by the dominant majority. When those who have been oppressed
neither erase their own memory of oppression by assimilating to the majority,
nor use the language of faith in the Constitution to push forward their agendas
for social change, they are treated as self-segregating by the wider population.
These individuals—those who take experiences of racial injustice and
reformulate them as black community pride, who take words of hatred and
reclaim them as names they give themselves—are viewed as the “wicked son.”

78. Balkin, supra note 48, at 1704 (“[W]e will tend to see the Constitution as standing
for whatever we believe is just, whether it does or not, and whether it ever will be so. In this
way the ‘true’ Constitution can be separated from any evils of the existing political system.
This is a matter of conforming the Constitution to our ideas of justice, and so we might call it
interpretive conformation.”) (emphasis added).
79. LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 31 (“One of the most remarkable evocations of a
textual Constitution is that of Frederick Douglass, the former slave who became a leading
abolitionist. Douglass freely conceded that many of the framers supported slavery and,
indeed, probably intended to ‘secure certain advantages in [the Constitution] for slavery.’ . . .
Yet he ‘den[ied] that the Constitution guarantees the right to hold property in man’ and
proposed to his audience an approach to the Constitution that would vindicate his otherwise
startling assertion.”).
80. Reva Siegel writes extensively about how social movements change our
understanding of the Constitution through public pronouncements about and contestations
over its meaning. She writes,
As groups make claims that the Constitution, as foundational law, speaks to various
controversies, they elaborate the Constitution’s meaning with respect to different institutions
and practices and so continually refresh the text’s normative ambit. Thus, the abolitionist
movement tied the Guarantee Clause to slavery, while the women’s movement tied it to
voting. The Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on slavery has been the focal point of
protests about work, segregation, and marriage. Over the life of the republic, groups have
sought constitutional amendments that would nationalize family law in order to restrict
divorce, outlaw child labor, or prohibit same-sex marriages. The groups that organized for
and against the woman’s suffrage and equal rights amendments also struggled over the ideal
forms of family life . . . . Through such understandings and practices, all manner of social
conflicts are channeled into struggles over the Constitution’s meaning, and the Constitution
comes to serve as a discursive medium through which individuals and groups engage in
disputes about the ideal forms of collective life.

Siegel, supra note 48, at 324-26.
81. See BALKIN, supra note 7, at 75.
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In this fashion, Malcolm X is the paradigmatic “wicked son,” for he responded
to endemic white racism not by turning the other cheek, but by asserting that
“We’re not Americans, we’re Africans who happen to be in America. We were
kidnapped and brought here against our will from Africa. We didn’t land on
Plymouth Rock—that rock landed on us.”82
Years before the “Birther Movement” questioned the very heart of the first
black president’s American-ness, Barack Obama was embroiled in a
controversy over his association with another “wicked son”—Obama’s former
pastor, the Reverend Jeremiah Wright. Rev. Wright’s statements present a
prime example of a “wicked son” who, once excluded from the majority
community, embraced that segregation with zeal—to the condemnation of the
community that excluded him in the first place. Perhaps the most vitriolic
statement publicized from among Rev. Wright’s sermons is the following:
“‘God bless America.’ No, no, no, God damn America, that’s in the Bible for
killing innocent people . . . God damn America for treating our citizens as less
than human. God damn America for as long as she acts like she is God and she
is supreme.”83 America—like the father of the Four Sons—responds to this
bitter denunciation by condemning and rejecting Rev. Wright all over again—
and, moreover, by threatening to reject President Obama, as well, for his
connection to this wicked son.
In an interview on Fox News’s Hannity & Colmes, the conservative Sean
Hannity impliedly accused Rev. Wright of being racist, un-American, and
separatist for asserting a black-centered theology. At one point in the colloquy,
Hannity recited the missions of Rev. Wright’s Trinity United Church of Christ,
as delineated on its website:
[HANNITY:] Commitment to the black community, commitment to the
black family, adherence to the black work ethic . . . strengthening and
supporting black institutions, pledging allegiance to all black leadership who
have embraced the black value system, personal commitment to the
embracement of the black value system. Now, Reverend, if every time we said
black, if there was a church and those words were white, wouldn’t we call that
church racist?
WRIGHT: No, we would call it Christianity. We’ve been saying that since
there was a white Christianity; we’ve been saying that ever since white
Christians took part in the slave trade; we’ve been saying that ever since they
had churches in slave castles. We don’t have to say the word “white.” We just
have to live in white America, the United States of white America.84

Hannity accused Rev. Wright of self-segregation and—by insinuation—of
black supremacy; Rev. Wright responded by recounting a history of white
82. PETER GOLDMAN, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF MALCOLM X 157 (1979) (quoting
Malcolm X, speaking in Harlem).
83. Abdon M. Pallasch, Obama Denounces Rhetoric but Stands Behind His Pastor,
CHI. SUN-TIMES (Mar. 16, 2008), http://www.suntimes.com/news/politics/obama/
844447,CST-NWS-wright15.article.
84. Interview by Sean Hannity, Fox News, with Rev. Jeremiah Wright (Mar. 1, 2007),
available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,256078,00.html.

2015]

ARCHETYPES OF FAITH

585

oppression. In Hannity’s challenge, we see the majority’s tendency to classify
as “wicked”—or racist, or extremist—those who, through centuries of
alienation, have come to identify more with their sub-community than with the
national community. Rev. Wright, in turn, located this “self-exclusion” in a
historical context, reminding Hannity that they do not share a common
foundation, and why.
Malcolm X and Rev. Jeremiah Wright—in their apparent rejection of the
dream of an integrated national community—are sharper analogs to the wicked
son than figures such as Frederick Douglass and Susan B. Anthony, who
subverted the dominant American discourse through aspirational visions of the
Constitution and challenges to its meaning as perpetuated by the status quo. But
the metaphor of the wicked son brings out important aspects of each. A
narrative of faith and obedience will almost always suppress narratives of
exclusion and injustice. A constitutional utopia of common belief and common
roots can always be countered by those brave enough, or marginalized enough,
to disrupt hegemony—by those seen as wicked for subverting a pleasing image
of faith and unity.
D.   The Problem of Doubt
One need not be enslaved or marginalized, however, to lose faith in a
system. One need not even lose faith entirely to question the precepts of one’s
organizing institutions. As much as the parable of the wicked son speaks to
exclusion, it also speaks to the ubiquity—and the problems—of questioning
and challenging one’s faith.
In the Jewish context, the bitterness of the father’s response to the wicked
son is somewhat surprising. Despite the tropes of obedience to law within
Judaism, discussed supra in Part III.B with respect to the wise son, Jewish
tradition also celebrates human capacity for reason, for struggle, and for
argument with God himself. Abraham and Jacob both fought mightily with
God: Abraham, in challenging God’s decision to destroy the city of Sodom;85
and Jacob, in wrestling with God’s messenger (he was thereafter named Israel,
or Yisrael, which literally means “fights with God”).86 Moreover, according to
tradition, God gave the Jewish people the Torah to argue over and interpret—a
human, not divine enterprise. These stories show a strong competing strain
within Judaism to consider the justice of particular laws and commands, not
merely to follow formalistic continuations of the status quo.
There is, nonetheless, a certain subversiveness to an inquiry into substance
rather than form. “You’re telling me to do all these things — but what do these
rituals mean to you?” In this sense, the wise and wicked sons are two necessary
pieces of the sustenance of constitutional faith. We have to ask both what the
rules are and why we bother with them. The wicked son provides the
85. Genesis 18.
86. Genesis 32.
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counterpart to the wise son’s formalism. If we believe that the rules are just,
this question shouldn’t bother us. But if we have doubts about the justness of
the rules, then that question can throw the whole project into jeopardy. The
answer we get, when we look hard at ourselves, is not always a kind answer, or
the answer we’d like. It can set our teeth on edge.
In this vein, another way of understanding the wise and wicked son is that
the wise son is a strict constructionist or formalist; the wicked son is a living
constitutionalist or, at least, a proponent of original meaning as explained by
Professor Jack Balkin.87 The former seeks literal meaning; the latter searches
for overarching meaning. The wicked son asks how a modern person can
understand the rituals. The father reminds the wicked son that such inquiries
may make us stray from our forefathers. But the father, again, misunderstands
the wicked son, who is trying to retain the relevance of an event long past in a
modern world. He is taking up the faith that past generations had in future
generations by leaving room for interpretation.
The living constitutionalist continues to search for meaning but does not
fully lose faith. He simply places his faith in a different location—not in the
text (as strictly or fundamentally interpreted), but in the possibility that its
meaning can be redeemed. In this sense, perhaps the wicked son does stumble:
if this process of redemption is to be realized, a living constitutionalist must
place great faith in his community (or its future generations) to be the
document’s redeemers. The wicked son, by distancing himself from his
community, veers away from the project of the living covenant and becomes
nothing more than an outside critic, detached from the process of redemption
that a quest for meaning should, aspirationally, produce.
Seen in this light, the wicked son is a cynic; he has left behind both faith in
text and faith in the promise of text. The father’s response to this disbelief is to
ostracize his son, as described above. Framed differently, the father responds
by mustering all the coercion at his disposal—which, admittedly, is not much.
He can only assert what would have happened in the past if his son had had this
type of attitude. But the father nonetheless “sets his [son’s] teeth on edge”—he
manipulates his son’s fear of violence, fear of slavery, to try to keep him in line
and force him to return to the community of faith.88
And thus arises the problem of violence in a system built on faith—a
problem even weightier in a system of laws. In a religious community, in the
absence of faith one finds detachment. A Jew who cannot recognize herself in
her community merely drifts away from that community and replaces it with
other communities and practices that hold more meaning for her.89 In religion,
87. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 7, at 3-20.
88. Some interpretations of this text suggest physical violence as well as symbolic

violence. See RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY, supra note 14, at 39 (“The literal meaning of hak-heh
et shinav is ‘set his teeth on edge’ (by a physical blow). But it might be more effective to
meet his contemptuous challenge with a trenchant retort.”).
89. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
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belief is a predicate to fear. After all, God’s wrath is an empty threat if one
believes that God does not exist; though of course, as in any close-knit groups,
there may be other coercive pressures exercised by the community itself to
enforce adherence even if belief in the ultimate project has dissipated.90
In the American constitutional system, however, fear must exist regardless
of belief in the justness of the system.91 We must remember that law is a
violent enterprise92—and that the violence of the state operates as harshly, if
not more harshly, upon nonbelievers as it does upon believers. While
individuals can theoretically “drift away” from the American community by
moving to another country, this is neither practical for many American
nonbelievers nor a real solution—after all, by leaving the American system one
cannot escape coercive political systems altogether. Thus, the wicked son’s
disbelief places strain on the conception of faith as a legitimate underpinning of
a coercive legal system, and reminds us of the persistence of violence in
maintaining outward unity when faith is insufficient.
In short, the wicked son is a reminder that systems of faith—even as they
unify—can create institutional pressures that exclude, that suppress doubt, and
that uphold a contested status quo. I argue that the father takes the wrong
approach to his wicked son’s challenges; but his response is not unusual in the
analog of American authority figures. The wicked son is a warning sign—that
we must consider seriously the problems of marginalization and disbelief in
order to create a more inclusive and adaptive community of faith.

90. In fact, the reality of religious violence over time—from the Inquisition, to the
Crusades, to today’s radical Islamic jihadism—makes a stronger case for why this
comparison of constitutionalism to religion is stronger than the comparison of law to
literature. The law and literature movement often has been criticized for ignoring the
disanalogy of law’s violence to literature’s aestheticism. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover,
Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601-02 & n.2 (1986); Austin Sarat & Thomas
R. Kearns, A Journey Through Forgetting: Toward a Jurisprudence of Violence, in THE
FATE OF LAW (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991); Robert Weisberg, Private
Violence as Moral Action: The Law as Inspiration and Example, in LAW’S VIOLENCE (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992). However, religious institutions, if not religious faith,
have been sullied by violence throughout time. Religion and law are both faith-based
systems that are often imposed through a regime of violence or, at the least, an appeal to a
higher authority who has the power to punish (in the afterlife, if not in the world of the
living). Religion has an authority that literature lacks. See, e.g., Thomas Grey, The
Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
91. See Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5
J.L. & RELIG. 65 (1987) (providing a description of the difference between obligation (in a
nonviolent legal system) and rights (in a coercive legal system)).
92. See, e.g., Cover, supra note 90, at 1601 (“Legal interpretation takes place in a field
of pain and death. This is true in several senses. Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion
the imposition of violence upon others: A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and
as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life.
Interpretations in law also constitute justifications for violence which has already occurred or
which is about to occur . . . . Neither legal interpretation nor the violence it occasions may be
properly understood apart from one another. This much is obvious, though the growing
literature that argues for the centrality of interpretive practices in law blithely ignores it.”).

588

STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW

[Vol. 26:555

V.   THE SON WHO DOES NOT KNOW HOW TO ASK
As for the son who does not know to ask — you begin for him. It is said, “You
shall tell your son in that day, saying, ‘It is because of what the Lord did for me
when I came out of Egypt’.”
In the Jewish tradition, there are at least two ways to understand the son
who does not know how to ask. Most commonly, he is interpreted as a very
young child who hasn’t learned to speak or to ask questions. He comes to the
seder with wide eyes and an open mind. He will one day grow to become one
of the other sons—but for now his future is undetermined. Alternatively, this
son may be so disconnected or marginalized from his culture and tradition that
he has lost even the language with which to ask questions—he is, in other
words, an extreme of the wicked son.93
The most important part of the father’s response to this son is the
instruction: “You begin for him.” Whether the child is overwhelmed by a
tradition that has become strange to him or merely young, it is the father’s
responsibility to guide him toward belief—and to show tremendous patience in
teaching him. “Chasam Sofer points out that the Haggadah uses a feminine
form (at) in telling us to initiate the discussion of the Exodus with this son. This
is to indicate that we are to give him gentle and lengthy explanations, as a
mother speaks to her child.”94
Surprisingly, the actual words that the father uses in his response here are
the same as those used to address the wicked son—“It is because of what the
Lord did for me when I came out of Egypt.”95 Why doesn’t the father include
the son in his response? The similar language may be offset by the different
tone of the exchange, tempered as it is by the words, “You begin for him.”
Perhaps, then, the response merely indicates patience, rather than exclusion; the
father gives the son time to feel comfortable within the Jewish people before
attributing experiences to him that he has not personally had. In this way, the
father models his own faith for his son. He is saying, “I believe. One day you
too will believe.” He simply provides an opening into the full tradition—“You
begin for him.”
Within American constitutionalism, there are two analogs to the son who
does not know how to ask: the first, and most straightforward, is America’s
youth; the second is those individuals who are so marginalized that they neither
make claims on the Constitution nor see it as relevant to their experience. These
are, of course, two dramatically different sets of people, and they invite
markedly different analyses. As with the Jewish tale, however, there is a

93. Some read the son who doesn’t know how to ask as an apathetic son. See Russell
Jay Hendel, The Educational Pedagogy of the Four Sons, 22 SHOFAR: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF JEWISH STUDIES 94 (2004).
94. STEIN, supra note 36, at 46.
95. Exodus 13:8 (emphasis added).
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unifying theme: the importance of extending an invitation to these sons who
find themselves standing outside the boundaries of the constitutional project. In
a diverse society, all responsibility cannot lie with the individual to seek out
and assert meaning; a sustainable community of faith requires both outreach
and education.
A.   The Educational Imperative
Let’s begin by considering the youngest members of the constitutional
community. Within the consciously intergenerational framework of the four
sons, the son who does not know how to ask most evocatively invites a
meditation on the intergenerational conveyance of knowledge—of the
socialization and education of the children who will become mature members
of the constitutional community. In particular, the fourth son invites a focus on
the quality—and equality—of our nation’s public schools, and on their success
at preparing children for the challenges of modern citizenship. How well we
“begin for” the sons who do not know how to ask depends on our commitment
to meaningfully educate all members of the community across race, class, and
geography. Unfortunately, as frequently discussed in scholarly literature and
popular discourse on education adequacy and equity, we have often fallen short
on meeting this commitment.96 “[S]chools are more segregated today than they
were in 1954 and the rate of resegregation is rapidly increasing.”97 The
education gap between rich and poor is growing, as well.98 One study “found
that the rich-poor gap in test scores is about 40 percent larger now than it was
30 years ago.”99 Disparities in educational opportunities have direct economic
and social consequences for underserved children, but also bear a significant
and detrimental impact on citizenship, including civic and political
engagement.100 A deficient educational system impoverishes the constitutional
community as a whole.
Read in this context of inequality, the father’s response to the fourth son—
“It is because of what the Lord did for me when I came out of Egypt”—takes

96. See, e.g., Sarah Jane Forman, Ghetto Education, 40 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 67
(2012); Robert A. Garda, Jr., Coming Full Circle: The Journey from Separate but Equal to
Separate and Unequal Schools, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2007); William S.
Koski & Rob Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat from Equity in Educational Law
and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 547 (2006); Michael A. Rebell, Poverty,
“Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L.
REV. 1467 (2007).
97. Garda, supra note 96, at 50.
98. Sabrina Tavernise, Education Gap Grows Between Rich and Poor, Studies Say,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/education/education-gapgrows-between-rich-and-poor-studies-show.html.
99. Sean F. Reardon, No Rich Child Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2013),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/27/no-rich-child-left-behind.
100. See generally Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116
YALE L.J. 330 (2006).
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on a sinister meaning, resonating with his identical response to the wicked son.
Rather than a gentle introduction—an invitation to participate in the
constitutional community—education can itself become an instrument of
exclusion. Whether the father’s response is a modeling of faith or a reminder of
difference depends on the quality and equality of the education we provide to
the children of all. When public education is inadequate and unequal, we risk
multiplying the number of excluded “wicked sons” or deeply ostracized “sons
who don’t know how to ask.” A robust educational system is necessary to
preserve a continuity of faith in future generations and minimize the risk of
marginalization when those generations come of age.
B.   The Precipice of Silence
This leads us to a discussion of the “other” fourth sons: those members of
the constitutional community who, for reasons of exclusion, isolation,
disappointment, or apathy do not participate in the constitutional project. These
sons act as a foil to the wicked sons, who respond to exclusion by rebelling
against or re-appropriating a discriminatory history. America does, indeed,
have within it people who have experienced only the failure of the American
dream; who have given up on the system and no longer feel inclined to
participate in—or struggle against—its myths.
Who exists within this category? I could point to the citizen who does not
vote; but to be sure, there are millions of citizens who may not cast a ballot in a
particular election, but who remain invested in the constitutional project. The
very nature of this group of people makes its categorization most challenging.
The disconnectedness of the fourth sons has the added effect of making them
more difficult to see, more difficult to account for.
The clearest way of recognizing these sons may be in identifying those
who have left their ranks. The sons who do not know how to ask are not
permanently and unalterably disengaged from American constitutional life. It
is useful to envision them as wicked sons waiting in the wings. The success of
some social reform movements—Cesar Chavez’s mobilization of farm
workers, for one—can be usefully understood as tipping points when sons who
knew not how to ask reimagined themselves as wicked sons and collectively
created change.
The modern gay rights movement provides another intriguing example. A
century ago—even a few short decades ago—the vast majority of gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgendered Americans suppressed or hid aspects of themselves
in order to fit into the constitutional community, largely without making claims
about the illegitimacy of exclusion from the constitutional order. Gay
Americans did not—or perhaps more accurately dared not—“ask” for equality.
In a famous debate between H. L. A. Hart and Patrick Lord Devlin in Britain in
the early 1960s about the legal regulation of morality, Devlin stated, “I do not
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think there is anyone who asserts vocally that homosexuality is a good way of
life.”101 Professor Robert Burt points out that while “[t]his is an utterly
implausible proposition today,” at the time it was not.102 It is difficult to
overstate the dramatic nature of the cultural, political, and constitutional
transformation since that time. We have witnessed robust advocacy for
constitutional recognition of the right to love a partner of one’s choosing—and
103
dramatic and rapid success in that effort. The repeal of the “Don’t Ask Don’t
104
Tell” policy is emblematic of the climb out of silence. Gay Americans know
how to ask, and have made their voices heard; they have participated in and
fought against the constitutional and social order—even though the “asking”
has involved suffering, risk, and confrontation. The successes of the gay rights
movement, moreover, demonstrate the permeability of the lines between each
of the four sons. Not only have former “fourth sons” morphed into “wicked
sons,” but many (though not all) “wise sons” and “simple sons” have accepted
and internalized constitutional claims that, once radical, are now indisputably
mainstream.105
This conception of the fourth son is markedly different than that of the
young child. But the communal obligation to this son is similar in an important
sense: it is the obligation to “begin for him.” In one sense, the gay rights
movement described above is a dramatic success story. In another sense, the
recent vintage of this movement is a testament to an extraordinarily long period
during which the constitutional community enforced rather than confronted the
fourth son’s silence. Just as the youthful fourth son invites reflection upon our
system of education, the marginalized fourth son invites consideration of
spaces of silence and invisibility perpetuated by our constitutional community,
and of ways in which the broader community can take affirmative steps to
recognize and hear each of its members.

101. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 116 (1965).
102. Robert A. Burt, Moral Offenses and Same Sex Relations: Revisiting The Hart-

Devlin Debate 9 (Yale Law Sch. Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper No. 711, 2004), available
at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/711.
103. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015) (holding that under the
Fourteenth Amendment, same-sex couples may not be deprived of the fundamental right to
marry).
104. This policy, in place from 1993 to 2011, permitted gay men and women to serve in
the military if they publicly suppressed their sexual identities. Chapter Five: Progress Where
You Might Least Expect It: The Military’s Repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 127 HARV. L.
REV. 1791 (2014).
105. A recent NBC/Wall Street Journal poll found that “59% of Americans support
allowing same-sex marriage, nearly double the 30% support reported in 2004.” Janet Hook,
Support for Gay Marriage Hits All-Time High—WSJ/NBC News Poll, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9,
2015, 6:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/03/09/support-for-gay-marriage-hitsall-time-high-wsjnbc-news-poll. At the time of writing, gay marriage is legal in 37 states and
the District of Columbia. Pew Research Center, Same-Sex Marriage State-by-State, PEW
FORUM (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/02/09/same-sex-marriage-state-bystate.
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VI.   BROWN AS PEDAGOGICAL MOMENT
Above, I have described the “Four Sons” of the American constitutional
faith, providing a framework for understanding how different types of people
keep faith with a single constitutional document and, together, form a
constitutional community.
This framework sheds light on why certain Supreme Court opinions—most
strikingly, Brown v. Board of Education106—resonate so deeply in our
collective constitutional consciousness that they become, in and of themselves,
articles of constitutional faith.
Brown, of course, tackled a controversy laden with enormous political
salience—and thus gave the Supreme Court a relatively rare opportunity to
speak to (and be heard by) a large cross-section of the American people. Yet
despite its uniqueness, we can learn something broader from Chief Justice
Warren’s opinion in the case, and from its responsiveness to multiple
audiences. Brown is an opinion that succeeded in speaking simultaneously to
each of the four sons of the American constitutional faith, and in this way came
to serve as a kind of “pedagogical moment,” a powerful instance of Higher
Lawmaking.
Most plainly, Brown spoke to the wise son—to the legal elite. Whatever its
larger sociopolitical function, Brown was first and foremost a judicial opinion,
written in the language of law and legal history, and dictating the authoritative
interpretation of (as the wise son would put it) the “testimonies and statutes and
ordinances . . . commanded you.” The decision had to be technical enough,
legalistic enough, to retain legitimacy for the critical audience of the wise son.
At the same time, however, Brown spoke directly to (and about) the
“wicked son”—but gave the wicked son a wholly different response than the
father does. As I have conceptualized the wicked son, he is the rebel who
challenges the status quo of the social order, who challenges the meaning
behind the rote obedience to the letter of the law. Certainly, the NAACP and
the civil rights movement more broadly can be understood as the wicked son—
daring white America, through peace protests and sit-ins and legal challenges to
segregation, to answer seriously the question, “What does this idea of freedom
mean to you?” The previous legal response to this question had taken its form
in Plessy v. Ferguson,107 in which the Court—like the father of the wicked
son—chastised the plaintiff, asserting that if blacks felt subjugated by
segregation, it was due to their own negative self-conception:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored
race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything

106. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
107. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it.108

In Brown, the Court changed course and took the “wicked” son seriously—took
responsibility for the problem of exclusion and sought to rectify it.109 The
Court wrote:
To separate [black schoolchildren] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone. . . . We conclude that in the field of public
education the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the
plaintiffs and others similarly situated . . . are, by reason of the segregation
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.110

At the same time, Brown spoke to the simple son—the American people
writ large. The decision was relatively short, relatively easy for the common
man to read in full. It was a unanimous opinion, presenting a united front that
the people could understand, and to which they could adhere—or against which
they could protest. Both because of the importance of the issue it addressed and
because the language of the decision was accessible, the decision was published
in newspapers across the country for the average person to read. And, certainly,
the dramatic southern resistance to Brown, as well as the staunch support it
found elsewhere, demonstrates the public salience of Brown’s substantive
effect, and the reality of the struggle between the People and the Court to
define the Constitution’s meaning.
Finally, the opinion spoke to the children who did not know how to ask.
The decision took seriously the problem of education in order to retain a
community of faith in the Constitution and the principle of equality
underpinning it. Chief Justice Warren wrote:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education
to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where
the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms.111

108. Id. at 551.
109. Of course, one might say that in responding to black grievances, the Court paved

the way for a new rebellious son—the white southerner who would defy the Court’s order.
110. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
111. Id. at 493.
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In the most practical way, Brown took up the challenge to “begin for” the child
who did not know how to ask—it moved toward a system of education
designed to teach children equally and justly. It both laid the foundation for a
future generation of children to have faith in their community, and tried to
avoid the problem of a group of citizens so disconnected from American
society that they would not even recognize the Constitution as relevant to their
lives.
Brown has retained a complex place in the hearts and minds of Americans.
On the one hand, it is practically revered—it has taken on a symbolic place as
significant for many as the Constitution itself.112 On the other hand, it has been
much criticized on its technical terms by the legal community—in other words,
by the wise sons.113 I do not argue that the decision was perfect; but I will note
that this intense criticism may have arisen in part because the decision was not
only written for the wise son (though the wise son is accustomed to such
exclusive attentions). The legal community has, perhaps, undervalued the ways
in which Brown spoke to multiple sectors of the community, in an effort to be
responsive to multiple expressions of faith. And it is, perhaps, Brown’s success
in reaching these multiple “sons” of America that has secured its place in the
canon of constitutional faith for the generations that followed.
Does every judicial opinion need to be like Brown? Of course not—not
least because most decisions don’t have the potential to impact (or even
interest) so many sectors of the American people. But I nevertheless look to
Brown to show how judges (and the Constitution itself) can be, and sometimes
are, responsive to the multidimensional community of faith we call America.
My point is not to dictate an interpretive methodology that judges should
employ to decide every case114—although it would, perhaps, be an interesting
112. See ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 137 (“Brown became a symbol energizing a
multiracial coalition of blacks and whites into an escalating political struggle against
institutionalized racism. As the 1950s moved on, this mobilized appeal for racial justice
struck deepening chords amongst broadening sectors of the citizenry—enabling the
Presidency and Congress of the mid-1960s finally to transform the embattled judicial
pronunciamentos of the mid-1950s into the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. As a consequence, Brown came to possess the kind of numinous
legal authority that is, I believe, uniquely associated with legal documents that express the
considered judgments of We the People.”); BALKIN, supra note 7, at 211 (“Constitutional
politics has made constructions like Brown and Loving not only easy cases, but foundational
to our understanding of the equal protection clause. Yet they were not always so central; at
one point they would have been highly controversial or even clearly wrong
constructions . . . .”).
113. See generally WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack
Balkin ed., 2001).
114. I have noted briefly above that various established modes of interpretation speak
more or less effectively to some sons than to others. But I do not mean to tether the wise
son’s realm of expertise; and in any event, to a large extent, the subtleties of how courts
decide cases will be lost on the simple and wicked sons, each of whom is more concerned, in
his own way, with substance than with style. The People care more whether Obamacare was
upheld, whether the Defense of Marriage Act was struck down, and whether affirmative
action in higher education was maintained, than why the Court reached the decisions it did.
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exercise to consider whether the Supreme Court’s decisions in other cases of
national importance115 might have resonated more deeply in our collective
constitutional faith had the Court taken different approaches in speaking to its
diverse audiences. But I do not claim that the Four Sons framework provides a
predictive or normative model for determining precisely when the Supreme
Court will or should engage in Higher Lawmaking.
It does, however, begin to answer when and why a judicial opinion might,
in speaking to the different sectors of the constitutional community, play a
significant role in the project of American constitutional faith and its endurance
over time. And, more fundamentally, it sheds light on how different sectors of
our constitutional community engage with and remain connected to our
Constitution, and in this way helps us to understand the very nature of that
community of faith.
CONCLUSION
Our national community is bound by something more than the force of
law—though it is bound by that too. On the whole, Americans share a faith in
the Constitution, a faith that goes beyond simple obedience and reaches the
realm of quasi-religious belief and devotion. This faith binds Americans to a
covenant ratified by a select few of their national ancestors. It binds Americans
to the generations long gone who once held the same faith, and to the
generations yet to come who, they hope, will one day share it. Americans
understand the Constitution not only to constrain them, but also to reflect who
they are, in the deepest sense. It is for this reason that the Constitution has
found its place at the heart of American culture wars—when Americans believe
something strongly, they want to find a reflection of that belief in the
Constitution they revere.
The faiths that Americans hold, however, are as multidimensional as the
nation is diverse. Americans differ not only in their substantive and
methodological interpretations of the Constitution,116 but in their capacities for
faith and the ways that they express the faith they hold. I use the analogy of the
Four Sons as a framework for understanding the diverse ways in which
Americans relate to and participate in the intergenerational constitutional
The popular embrace of originalism by ordinary conservatives since the Reagan era may
suggest otherwise—but the mobilization of Republicans around originalism is better
understood a political, rather than an interpretive, movement—one that has tapped into a
substantive, activist conservative agenda. See generally Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
545 (2006).
115. A few controversial and politically salient Supreme Court decisions come to mind:
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
116. Sanford Levinson points out that faith is as divisive as it is unifying. Faith can be
(and historically, has been) a catalyst for holy wars of interpretation. See LEVINSON, supra
note 1, at 17.
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project; and I assert that an attention to this diversity is crucial. To sustain itself
over time, a community of faith must be responsive to the differing capacities
of its members; it must speak to the different expressions of faith, value each
one, and foster its growth and development so that each individual feels that
she has a stake in the Constitution itself. The constitutional project, as a whole,
touches all Americans—not only through its coercive effect as law, but also
through its symbolic significance as Higher Law. But more, the constitutional
project relies on the contributions of the various segments of the population in
order to function as an intergenerational project. The complexity of how
Americans can and do express their constitutional commitment—interpreting,
challenging, adoring, starting anew—is what sustains the Constitution’s
relevance and importance across time.

